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Agriculture in the Nation's Economy *
WE HAVE flOW to summarize the results set forth in preceding
chapters and to consider their implications. Over the four
decades since 1899 the output of farm products increased by
about 50 percent, or at a somewhat slower rate than popula-
non.' Changes in the composition of this output were re-
viewed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3; here the briefest re-
capitulation must suffice. Citrus fruit increased in output
more than tenfold; the production of sugar, vegetable oils,
milk products and poultry doubled; potatoes and tobacco
rose a little more than 50 percent. Cotton and livestock ex-
panded less than 50 percent; grain production was about the
same at the end of the period as at the beginning; and the
net output of hay felt sharply over the four decades. These
movements may be observed in comparative form in Chart 3.
In interpreting the behavior of the production data we
found (Chapter 3) that the contraction of exports (in abso-
lute terms and relative to farm output) has played an espe-
cially important part in moderating the expansion in the
output of the grains, of cotton, and of livestock products.
Tobacco, on the other hand, has been much better able to
maintain its position in export markets, and its production
* A note on this chapter, by C. Reinold Noyes, Director, appears on pp.
316-21.
1 Deficient coverage in early years is probably responsible for some down-
ward bias in our index of output, i.e. it does not rise quite as rapidly as it
should. On the most extreme assumption possible, i.e. that the output of
every product omitted in 1899 was zero in that year, the rise in an index
which included these items for the entire period would still be less than 60
percent (see Appendix A). Population rose by 75 percent between 1899 and
1939.
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has been hampered to a smaller extent by the decline in for-
eign trade. To what is the decline in agricultural exports to
be attributed? Among various causes the tariff policy of the
United States itself is sometimes cited. Certainly the Fordney-
McCumber Act of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930
raised tariff rates on manufactured goods, on many minerals,
and on some few farm products that are imported, to levels
not previously attained. The consequent discouragement of
imports might conceivably react upon farm exports in two
principal ways. A rise in the price of manufactures, for
example of farm machinery, might raise the costs of farming,
and so both diminish the supply of farm products and push
their prices to a level at which exportation became unprof-
itable. But this line of reasoning is tenuous, and seems to
have had little applicability during our period of study. In
fact the agricultural staples that are commonly exported
were in ample supply in most years, and there is little to
suggest that their prices were pushed up by high farming
COStS. The other principal way in which tariff policy may
have reacted upon farm exports is through the diminution
of the supply of dollars available to our customers who were
unable to make sales in the United States. This approach
perhaps affords a more promising method of tying up the
observed reduction of agricultural exports with domestic
tariff policy. At the same time, however, one must recall that
for a considerable part of the period under observation ex-
ports were to a large extent financed by foreign lending or
by the import of gold, so that the connection between total
United States imports and total exports from this country
must have been a somewhat loose one.
In the future there may possibly arise situations in which
the volume of farm exports is immediately related to the
level of the tariff. We cannot doubt that in the long run our
tariff policy is one of the determinants of the total volume of
our exports, for anything which restricts imports must even-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 293
tually restrict exports also. But since the beginning of the
century it would seem likely that other factors in the situa-
tion were of more immediate importance, at any rate in re-
ducing the volume of farm exports. We have already referred,
for instance, to the trend toward agricultural protection in
Europe, a trend with many different elements, and one which
may be explained only to a minor degree, if at all, by the
tariff policy of this country. Partly because of this, but partly
also as a result of progress in the art of manufacturing, the
character of American exports has undergone a drastic
change. For example, around 1900 about two fifths of Ameri-
can exports (in value terms) consisted of foodstuffs; in recent
years, before the outbreak of the present war, foods com-
prised only about one tenth of all our exports. In part at
least, the decline in farm exports is the obverse of the in-
creased contribution to total exports by the products of man-
ufacturing industry—a shift which would naturally occur as
the nation became more highly industrialized.
Whatever its causes, the decline in the share of farm pro-
duce absorbed by overseas markets has substantially increased
the influence of the domestic consumer in determining the
output of agriculture as a whole, and of individual farm
products, from one period to another. The fact that some 85
percent of net farm output is destined for human food, most
of which is consumed domestically, prompted us to examine,
in Chapter 4, the character of the nation's food supply. The
main findings of that inquiry were a rather steady decline in
per capita intake of calories, and a tendency toward expan-
sion in the consumption of milk products and fresh fruit
and vegetables. Such an increased use of the "protective
foods" is in accordance with the recommendations of dietary
science. On the other hand, both the tentative estimates we
have been able to make for per capita consumption of sev-
eral vitamins and minerals, and the results of other recent
studies, suggest that there are still serious nutritional deft-294 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
ciencies in the diet of a large part of the population. Ac-
cordingly, the principal scope for the expansion of agricul-
tural output in the future appears to be in the production of
larger quantities of the "protective foods." This seems likely
to come about partly by spontaneous assimilation, through
rising living standards, of lower-income-bracket dietsto
those already common in the upper income brackets; and
partly through the more general dissemination of recent ad-
vances in nutritional knowledge. A greatly increased demand
in the future for the older staple foodstuffs, for textile fibers,
or for tobacco, appears, especially in view of the slowing
down of population growth, to be much more problematical.
So much for trends in output. What is to be said concern-
ing agricultural productivity?
In spite of the difficulty of measuring agricultural employ-
ment, we can say at least that it was no higher, and probably
that it was somewhat lower, in 1939 than in 1899. Total num-
bers occupied (including women, and children 10 years of
age and over) reached a peak some time between 1910 and
1920, and in 1930 stood 3 or 4 percent lower than in 1900;
but this movement concealed an increase of about 10 per-
cent in farmers plus adult male laborers (Table 36). It may
be supposed that on the average women and children work
less hard and less continuously than do adult males. Clearly
an index of labor input which took proper account of such
differences would move somewhere between the indexes just
quoted, and would reveal little change between 1900 and
1930. Data for computing the number of farmers and adult
male laborers from the 1940 Census have not yet been re-
leased; but in 1940 total numbers occupied fell sharply to a
point 16 percent belowtheir level at the turn of the century.
It seems probable that other measures of labor input also
would be lower in 1940 than in 1900 if we could compute
them. Thus, farmers and adult male laborers began to de-
cline after 1920, and in 1940 must have numbered about theSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 295
same as in 1900. If suitable account is taken of women and
child workers, therefore, employment in 1940 would meas-
ure perhaps 5 or 10 percent, but not as much as 16 percent,
below its level at the beginning of the century. And if labor
input was lower at the end of the forty-year period covered
by this study than it was at the beginning, production per
worker must have increased somewhat more rapidly than
total output, i.e., by more than 50 percent (Table 38). Put
otherwise, labor input per unit of output must have declined
by at least one third.
If we take a somewhat longer view and carry our indexes
back to 1870, we find that output almost quadrupled, while
the labor force increased during the seven decades consid-
ered by about one third (without regard to changes in its
composition). As a result, output per worker nearly tripled,
increasing at an average rate of about 16 percent per decade
(Table 39). The gain in productivity seems to have been par-
ticularly rapid since 1920, but this may result from the in-
creasing proportion of adult males in the labor force.
The prevalence of mixed farming, and the impossibility of
obtaining comprehensive data for the labor input associated
with individual products, prevent us from accurately distrib-
uting these gains in efficiency among different kinds of out-
put or varieties of farming enterprise. But the discussion in
the preceding chapter suggests that productivity has increased
more rapidly in crop production than it has in dairying or
the raising of livestock. Nor is such a result surprising, in the
light of the advances iii agricultural technology described in
Chapter 5. It is plain that in this field the outstanding devel-
opment of the last forty years has been the exploitation of
the gasoline tractor; and it is easy to see that economies in
crop labor attributable to the tractor must have far out-
weighed similar economies in the raising of livestock or the
care of milk cows. Moreover, although the mechanization of
dairying is capable of lightening in marked degree the bur-296 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
den of caring for milk cows, the evidence adduced in Chap-
ter 7 suggests that up to the present such effects have been
largely offset by more stringent sanitary regulation of the
dairy industry. Indirectly the tractor has aided dairying by
improving the availability of feed. And it is possible that in
the future improved breeding methods, and the more gen-
eral application of mechanical power (e.g.) to milking, may
lead to gains in the efficiency of dairying comparable to those
already achieved in the production of staple crops.
Trends in output, employment and output per worker
in agriculture are in marked contrast to analogous trends in
manufacturing industry. Compared with a 50 percent in-
crease in farm production, the physical output of manufac-
tured goods in 1939 was some four times its volume at the
beginning of the century. Whereas the output of farm prod-
ucts barely kept pace with population growth, that of manu-
factures grew far more rapidly. Moreover, while farm em-
ployment in 1940 was the same as, or somewhat smaller
than, it had been in 1900, employment in manufacturing
nearly doubled in four decades. The contrast in the behavior
of output per worker is somewhat less striking but still sig-
nificant: for agriculture the index rose by about 50 percent,
while for manufacturing it doubled. If we could compare
changes in output per manhour in the two branches of activ-
ity a sharper contrast would probably result, for data consid-
ered in Chapter 7 suggest that the reduction in the hours of
agricultural labor (per week or per year) have been slight,
whereas similar reductions in manufacturing are known to
have been substantial.
The stationary level of employment and the comparatively
mild expansion in output shown by agriculture would prob-
ably contrast markedly with experience in several other seg-
ments of industry besides manufacturing, were comparable
data available. But since we seek to observe the change in the
status of agriculture in the economy of the nation as a whole,SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 297
our purpose should be to compare farming, not with this or
that activity selected at random, but rather with all other in-
dustries combined. This can be done only for characteristics
that are measurable over the entire economy. For physical
output no such comprehensive data are available, but we do
have estimates for the total number of gainful workers, and
for national income, for the United States as a whole at dif-
ferent dates. The positiQn of agriculture in the economy is
illustrated in terms of these measures in Tables 53 and 54.
The estimates for the share of income accruing to agricul-
ture are probably subject to a rather wide margin of error
in early years, but it has seemed preferable nevertheless to
present data for as long a period as possible.
TABLE 53
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF AGRICULTURE AND
MANUFACTURING IN REALIZED INCOME,
1799 39.5 4.8 55.7
1809 34.0 6.1 59.9
1819 34.4 7.5 58.1
1829 34.7 10.3 55.0
1839 34.6 10.3 55.1
1849 31.7 12.5 55.8
1859 30.8 12.1 57.1
1869 24.1 15.9 60.0
1879 20.7 14.5 64.8
1889 15.8 21.1 63.1
1899 21.2 19.6 59.2
1909 22.1 20.1 57.8
1919 22.9 25.8 51.3
1929 12.7 26.2 61.1
1937 12.3 . 30.3 57.4
a R.F. Martin, National Income in the United States, 1799—1938 (National
Industrial Conference Board, 1939), Table 17. Data for 1937 exclude benefit
payments. The income totals on which these percentages are based include
neither corporate savings nor income produced by government. On this ac-
count the percentages shown above for agriculture and for manufacturing run
somewhat higher than those given by Simon Kuznets, National Income and
its Corn positzon, 1919—1938 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941),
Table 12.298 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
It will be seen that the farmer's share in national income
has followed a downward trend for at least a century; by
contrast the fraction of income accruing to manufacturing
industry exhibits a rising tendency. To a large extent these
two movements have been complementary, the expansion of
manufacturing being but the obverse of the relative stagna-
tion of agriculture. The percentage of income accruing to
"other activities" in Table 53 has not altered greatly.
Figures for recent years compiled at the National Bureau
by Simon Kuznets suggest that within the past decade the
downward trend in the percentage of income accruing to
agriculture may have been arrested, at least temporarily.2
For example, according to Dr. Kuznets' data, which include
benefit payments in agricultural income and differ in scope
from the figures in Table 53 in other respects also, no decline
occurred between 1929 and 1937 in agriculture's share of the
income of the nation. In what measure the recovery of agri-
culture's share from an all-time low in 1932 is to be attrib-
uted to the Agricultural Adjustment program it is impossible
to say.
For the distribution of gainfully occupied workers we have
estimates by the Bureau of the Census which begin in 1820
and tell a similar story. Here again (Table 54) the share of
agriculture has declined and the share of manufacturing
has risen. In 1870 more than half the occupied population
was engaged in agriculture; in 1940 little more than one
sixth.3 Half the occupied population is now engaged in activ-
2SimonKuznets, National Income and Its Composition, 1919—1938 (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1941), Table 12, p. 164.
3Inrespect of income shares "other activities" appear not to have altered
their importance appreciably (Table 53); whereas it would seem that agri-
culture has lost workers (relatively speaking) not only to manufacturing but
to other occupations also, and the latter change appears to be the larger. As a
means of judging shifting importance, Table 54 probably gives the more
accurate picture, for the income data we have quoted (Table 53) take no
account of income produced by governmental activity, increasingly important
in recent decades.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 299
ities other than farming and manufacturing, and the in-
creases have been largest in clerical occupations and in the
professions.
The striking decline in the relative importance of agricul-
ture in the economy of the nation must undoubtedly be
attributed to the superior attractiveness of other occupa-
tions. At the same time one must avoid the conclusion that
TABLE 54
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF AGRICULTURE AND

















1880 49.4 22.1 28.5
1890 42.6 23.7 33.7
1900 37.5 24.8 37.7
1910 31.0 28.5 40.5





Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Industrial Distribution of the Nation's
Labor Force: 1870 to and "Trends in the Proportion of the Nation's
Labor Force Engaged in Agriculture: 1820 to 1940" (press releases, Oct. 23,
and March 28, 1942 respectively).
Includes government.
since the share of farming in the national income has been
consistently smaller than its share in numbers engaged (see
Tables 53 and 54) it therefore provides us with a measure of
the unattractiveness of agriculture. This is certainly not the
case. During the first half of the nineteenth century, at a
time when farming did not yet suffer in any important de-300 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
gree from the competition of manufacturing in attracting re-
sources, agriculture's share of the national income was only
about one third, despite the fact that it provided a living for
more than half of the occupied population. In the case of
farming, measurable income per occupied person has prob-
ably been below the national average since very early times,
yet this state of affairs does not indicate an inferior position
in the competition for the economic resources of the nation.
Such statistics understate the net advantages of farming for
several reasons. First, we cannot take adequate account of in-
come produced in kind. Second, rural occupations probably
have a superior appeal for many persons. Third, capital em-
ployed in agriculture tends to be owned by those who are
themselves engaged in farming, so that the fraction of in-
come accruing to those who do not report themselves as
occupied in the industry is smaller in agriculture than it is
elsewhere. Finally, agriculture bulks large in several south-
ern states where income per person occupied (in all indus-
tries together) is much below the national average.
Farming has a powerful attraction for large numbers of peo-
ple, in spite of the risks and hardships associated with it, and
the low financial return that it yields to the capital and labor
employed. It commonly assures at least a minimum living at
moderate cost. It is easy to enter, though for certain types con-
siderable capital isessential.It does not require extensive
training, though specialized education and experience both
contribute to efficiency and pecuniary success. Children of
farmers particularly find it easy to stay on the farm, and
adults established in farming often find it difficult to quit.
Many like not only to live but to work in the open country,
and get very real satisfaction out of cooperating with Nature
in making plants and animals grow. Farming is the principal
remaining field of independent enterprise other than retail-
store keeping, and that freedom is cherished in spite of its
practical limitations. Many who have tried urban occupationsSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 301
and residence find that these have drawbacks not apparent at
first sight. Moreover, developments of recent years have made
available to farmers in some countries, at a cost within reach
of large numbers, such additions to their traditional standards
of living as electricity, the telephone, automobile, and radio,
and have lightened their drudgery with mechanical devices
for farming and the farm household.4
For all these reasons, the fact that measurable income per
head is lower in farming than elsewhere can in no wise be
taken as proof of the inferior attractiveness of agriculture as
a form of economic activity.5 Nevertheless, although it can-
not be demonstrated statistically, we may be reasonably cer-
tain that the real return to farming has lagged in competi-
tion with other types of activity. Only on the assumption
that this is so can we explain, in a system of free enterprise
and choice of occupation, the apparently continuous decline
in the importance of farming in the economy as a whole.
An agriculture which expands less rapidly than other
forms of activity, or which shows actual contraction, has,
with only temporary exceptions, been a characteristic of the
industrialization of most if not all western countries. In
Britain, for example, those engaged in agriculture repre-
sented 12.5 percent of all gainfully occupied in 1881, 5.7
percent in 1931. In Germany the corresponding percentage
declined from 41.5 in 1882 to 33.7 in 1933. Similar results
could be quoted for other European and probably also for
some Asiatic countries. It may be objected that in Europe the
trend was magnified through the substitution of imported
foodstuffs and textile materials for the products of domestic
agriculture; in the United States the substitution of imported
4J.S. Davis, On Agriculturat Policy, 1926—1938 (Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, 1939), pp. 34-35.
5Agriculture'ssmaller share in income than in numbers has also been noted
in Germany. See Wilhelm Bauer and Peter Dehen, "Landwirtschaft und
Volkseinkommen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1938—39, pp.
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for domestic foods and fibers has played but a microscopic
role in retarding the growth of farming. But it is doubtful if,
even in Europe, except perhaps in Britain, the substitution
of imported for domestic farm products has been the most
important factor in the growth of nonagricultural occupa-
tions at the expense of farming. Nor can the drop in the
exports of American farm products explain the decline in
the relative importance of agriculture in this country, for the
latter antedates the former. Declining exports, like the dis-
appearance of the urban demand for horse feed, have inten-
sified a trend which began many decades earlier.
To discover the factors chiefly responsible for the declin-
ing relative importance of agriculture as a source of liveli-
hoOd we must look elsewhere. In the first place, farmers are
now relieved of many of the functions which they once per-
formed. The manufacture of butter and cheese and the
slaughtering of animals have been largely transferred, within
the last hundred years, to nonagricultural establishments.
Even more important in recent decades has been the substi-
tution of mechanical for animal power. Time was when the
farmer raised both his own horses and the materials with
which to feed them: now he buys tractors, gasoline and oil.
These transfers of function—mainly from farming to manu-
facturing—have diminished the number of agricultural work-
ers needed to produce a unit of farm output. But we should
beware of assuming, merely on this account, that the total
number of persons—farmers and nonfarmers—engaged in pro-
ducing a given product has diminished.6
6Thetransfer of cheesemaking from the farm to the factory had been prac-
tically completed by 1899. Some slaughtering is still performed on farms, but
the majority of animals were already being killed at the factory when our
period opened. The production of farm butter has been diminishing, but it
is still important: our indexes of output and productivity are so constructed
that they take this change into account. In Chapter 7 estimates were given
for the saving of labor occasioned by the tractor in the raising and feeding
ol work animals, but no allowance for this saving has been made in comput-
ing our indexes, and in this respect they overstate the rise in agricultural
productivity.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 303
When all necessary allowance has been made, however, for
qualifications of this sort, it still appears to be true that the
proportion of the labor force engaged in agricultural pur-
suits has declined rather steadily. Now, we should expect
those branches of activity in which technological develop-
ment is most rapid to lose labor, as the years go by, to other
branches whose techniques of production have progressed
little or not at all—unless indeed products of the one group
can be substituted for products of the other group easily
enough to prevent this from happening.7 Prominent among
the first group are most of the commodity-producing indus-
tries; among the second, those types of endeavor whose busi-
ness it is to furnish services. In a rough kind of way we may
identify the latter group with the "other activities" of Table
54. As employers of labor these activities—and especially edu-
cational, medical, distributive and governmental services—
have become steadily more important. Data for 1940 have not
yet been released: but we may note that although the fraction
of the labor force engaged in manufacturing and mechani-
cal industries was higher in 1920 than it had been at any
previous Census, by 1930 these occupations also had begun to
lose adherents to "other activities." In large part such devel-
opments must be viewed as the natural outcome of differing
rates of technological advance.
But technological change is not the whole story. It seems
likely that agriculture's share of the working population has
7AlfredMarshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed. Macmillan, 1920), pp.
274-77. However, there is evidence that an opposite relation holds among
individual manufacturing industries. For these industries changes in output
per worker and in employment appear to be positively correlated. (See Solo-
mon Fabricant, The Relation Between Factory Employment and Output
Since 1899, Occasional Paper 4, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941,
pp. 16-20; the matter is discussed further in the same author's Employment in
Manufacturing, 1899—1939, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942.) No
doubt the substitutability among manufactured products is greater than that
between such products and other types of good. If the demand for the PrOdLict
of an industry is sufficiently elastic, its employment may clearly increase even
in the face of very rapid technological change.304 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
declined for other reasons also. We have seen that among
farm products foodstuffs are easily first in quantitative im-
portance. In the United States, judged by value, about 85
percent of net farm output consists of food for human con-
sumption. For purely physiological reasons there is a rather
rigid limit to per capita consumption of food in terms of
weight, calories and other constituents. For a population
with a given age distribution, therefore, we should expect
the demand for food to be inelastic, when related to real in-
come, once this limit is approached.8 The results of family
budget studies suggest that this is the case, i.e. that the elas-
ticity in question is positive but less than unity.° As long as
the elasticity is positive, we would expect some increase in
consumer expenditure on food to accompany an increase
in real income. But it is not so certain that higher living
standards must also involve increased expenditure upon the
output of foodstuffs by farmers. For increased expenditure
on food by consumers may mean merely that the packaging
or processing of the foodstuffs in question has become more
elaborate, or it may reflect the purchase of increased amounts
of the services associated with food consumption—for exam-
ple, of restaurants. The tendency for increased food expendi-
tures to take this form suggests that the elasticity of demand
for the raw foodstuffs produced by agriculture must be sig-
nificantly less than the corresponding elasticity as measured
by consumer expenditures.
The elasticity which is relevant to the demand for agricul-
tural output is of course one which measures the increase in
the consumption of raw foodstuffs, rather than the increase
8Elasticityof demand in terms of income is measured approximately by
the percentage increase in consumption associated with a 1 percent increase
in income.
For example, data collected by the National Resources Committee for
1935—36 yield an indicated elasticity of demand for food, in terms of income,
oabout 0.5 for the population as a whole (National Resources Planning
Board, Consumer Expenditures intheUnited States, Washington, 1939,
Tables 19A and 20A).SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 305
in consumer expenditures for food, which occurs as the real
income of the community rises. We may first of all consider
the consumption of such foodstuffs by weight or in terms of
calories. 1n the case of the United States, as we have seen in
Chapter 4, rising living standards 10 have been accompanied
by an actual reduction in per capita consumption of calories.
We should hesitate to conclude on this account that the
elasticity of the demand for food, even when expressed in
calories, in terms of real income, is actually less than zero, for
concurrent changes have also taken place in the occupations
and habits of the population, changes related only very indi-
rectly to the increase in per capita real income as this concept
is ordinarily understood. Moreover, there probably still çxist
in the United States some rather restricted groups of people
who consume substantially less than their physiological re-
quirements, not of this or that food element, but of food
in general, whether measured in pounds or in calories. Yet
when all necessary qualifications have been made, it seems an
inevitable conclusion that the income elasticity of demand
for food in general—in this sense—cannot be significantly pos-
itive in the United States today. We may expect, in other
words, that a further rise in the standard of living will in-
deed lead to larger (though not proportionately larger) con-
sumer expenditures on food, but will fail to lead to any
appreciable increase in food consumption per capita, meas-
ured in physical terms, even if important changes should
occur in the character of the food supply. But elasticity of
demand is not the only consideration. As the average age
of the population continues to rise and occupations become
more sedentary, it is likely that we shall see a continuation of
the tendency for per capita consumption of food, in terms
10Percapita income in constant prices, increased about 10 per-
cent between 1909—13 and 1934—38 (Simon Kuznets, National Income and Its
Composition) 1919—38, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941), Table
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of calories, to decrease. Similar conclusions would probably
hold for other western countries.
Once per capita intake of food approaches its physiological
optimum (or maximum)—and we must suppose that for the
bulk of the population in the United States this stage was
reached many decades ago—we should expect a decline in the
fraction of the community's resources devoted to producing
food. Only if there were marked changes in the composition
of the food supply, or an entire absence of technical progress
in agriculture, would this expectation be unfulfilled. But we
know that in fact continua' advance has characterized agri-
cultural technology; while crop yields per acre have increased
only slowly, substantial increments have occurred in output
per worker engaged. To be sure, the decline in labor per unit
of product has been more rapid in many other sectors of the
economy than it has in agriculture; but where the. income
elasticity of demand for the product of an industry is zero,
any increase in labor productivity must lead to a decline in
its percentage share of occupied population. in the past the
farmer has chiefly sold calories, the elasticity of demand for
which is low. This goes far to explain the decline in the rela-
tive importance of farming that has already occurred. Unless
other factors intervene, moreover, the further advances that
may be anticipated in agricultural technique appear to in-
sure that the secular decline in the fraction of the nation's
human resources engaged in farming will continue.
Unless other factors intervene: but what are the other fac-
tors that must be considered in this connection? One has
already been suggested—the possibility of a change in the
character of the food supply. The rather rigid limitation im-
posed by physiological considerations upon food intake in
terms of pounds or calories does not rule out a shift toward
more expensive foodstuffs—those which use up a larger quan-
tity of agricultural resources per pound or calorie. Man does
not live by calories alone, and both the foods richest in vita-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 307
mills and minerals and those of superior flavor require in
general a larger expenditure of resources per calorie or per
pound of nutrient than do the traditional staples in the diet
of our ancestors. It is probable that a continued upward tend-
ency in real income per capita will lead to a diversification of
diet of this character. We can hardly hope to determine to
what extent such a change can be expected to result from ad-
vances in nutritional education or medical propaganda, and
to what extent it may eventually come about through the
reconciliation of diets characteristic of the lower income
brackets with those common in the upper brackets. But that
such a change is already under way may be seen from the
evidence presented in Chapter 4, and especially from the
persistent decline in the per capita consumption of cereals.
It was suggested in Chapters. 5 and 7 that technical progress
has been slower in the production of dairy products and
vegetables than in that of crops, and it may well be that the
provision of a given supply of calories in the first form re-
quires more labor than in the second. But there are already
indications that this backwardness in technique may be reme-
died before long, perhaps through wider use of milking ma-
chines and advances in breeding in the case of dairying, and
the all-purpose tractor and the selection of seed in the raising
of vegetables. The tendency for dairy and other livestock
products to expand faster than crop production, a tendency
which, we saw in Chapter 2, dates from about 30 years ago,
is likely enough to continue. Yet it does not seem probable
that this trend can do more than mitigate in some degree the
decline to be expected for other reasons in the demand for
the services of agriculturalists."
11Ithas been suggested (J. P. Cavin, H. K. Stiebeling and Marius Farioletti,
"Agricultural Surpluses and Nutritional Deficits," Yearbook of Agriculture,
1940, p. 334) that raising the American diet to the level designated by the
Bureau of Home Economics as "expensive good diet" would call into produc-
tion some 30 to 40 million acres; such a quantity would constitute a substan-
tial compensation for acreage taken out of producing staples and might be
capable of absorbing a sizable fraction of the present surplus farm popula-308 AMERICAN
Asecond possible development that might check the secu-
lar decline in the relative importance of agriculture is an
expansion in the demand for industrial raw materials. The
chief industries using farm products are those processing to-
bacco, cotton and wool; industries making or using starches
and oils; and industries manufacturing wine, beer and dis-
tilled spirits. The demand by these industries for the prod-
ucts of domestic agriculture depends partly upon the availa-
bility of similar materials from abroad, and partly upon the
competition of substances not of agricultural origin. The
principal domestic products subject to competition from im-
ports are vegetable oils, wool and hides—and among the
foodstuffs, sugar. In the case of at least two of these—wool and
sugar—domestic output has been powerfully influenced by
the availability of imported supplies.'2 The competition of
nonagricultural products is felt mainly in respect to fibers;
there can be little doubt that rayon has diminished the de-
mand for cotton and possibly, to a minor extent, for wool
also. But apart from substitutions of this sort, the elasticity
of demand, in terms of real income, for textile products in
general is probably not very great, even if it considerably ex-
ceeds the very low elasticity we associate with foodstuffs.
tion. The assumption is not, however, too realistic. At manhours prevailing
in 1932—36—as estimated in various National Research Project studies—a rais-
ingofour diet to not quite as high a level, namely that designated "good"
(see Chapter 2 above) would, according to estimates made by the authors,
call for an additional expenditure of 2.8 billion manhours, or 900,000 man-
years at 3,000 hours per man per year. This calculation rests on the assump.
tions (1) that no compensating reductions in output occur in other parts of
agriculture,i.e.,that the additions suggested above are net;(2)that the
1)roposecl changes are accomplished in a comparatively short time interval
so that their effect in providing additional labor opportunities will not be
seriously impaired by technological advances in just those expanding fields.
Furthermore, the conversion of manhours into manyears rests on the ques-
uonable ratio oF 3,000 hours per year and assumes that none of the addi-
tional labor could be performed by agriculturalists not now fully employed.
However rough the nature oF these computations, they indicate that not too
much can be expected from shifts in diet.
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National Resources Committee data for 1935—36 indicate an
elasticity of about 0.9 for clothing, which suggests increased
purchases slightly less than proportionate to any rise of in-
come which may occur. It is unlikely, however, that the
income elasticity of demand for raw fibers to be used for
clothes is as high as this; for we must suppose that increased
expenditures for clothing result, in part at least, from a
higher degree of fabrication of the article concerned.
To be sure, a large amount of attention has been devoted
to the question of new uses for cotton—for example as a base
for plastics and even as road material. Indeed it seems obvi-
ous that any substantial expansion in the use of farm prod-
ucts as industrial materials must come as a result of technical
changes outside agriculture. The more extended use of vege-
table oils and of a wide range of corn and soybean by-
products by the chemical and allied industries must wait
upon the progress of manufacturing technology. Most agri-
cultural products can be converted into industrial alcohol;
large quantities of grain will undoubtedly be used for the
purpose during the present war. Attempts to manufacture
paper from cornstalks have been a failure commercially,
whereas the use of flaxstraw in making carpets has apparently
succeeded.'3 But there is little sign that potential uses of this
kind for farm products offer a field in which they can effec-
tively compete with much cheaper substances derived from
other sources. It is possible therefore, though it seems un-
likely, that developments of the kind mentioned will arrest
the transfer of labor from agriculture to other occupations.
Thirdly, the downward trend in the relative importance
of agriculture may conceivably be halted through a revival of
foreign trade. As long as the present war lasts, the volume of
farm exports will be determined mainly by the size and scope
of lend-lease shipments. To date, so far as concerns agricul-
13H.E. Barnard, "Prospects for Industrial Uses for Farm Products," Journal
of Farm Economics, Vol. XX (Feb. 1.938), pp. 119-33.310 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
tural commodities, these shipments have consisted largely of
food products of animal origin. The export of such staples as
cotton and tobacco has fallen to a low level. After the war is
over, large quantities of American farm products will prob-
ably be sent to Europe and elsewhere during the process of
reconstruction. But the question considered here concerns a
rather longer view. What are the prospects for agricultural
exports in the post-war world? Certainly, with the possible ex-
ception of tobacco, the trend in farm exports has been down-
ward for at least two decades.'4 A reversal of this trend has fre-
quently been held to depend on the inauguration of a regime
of freer international trade. There can be no doubt that the
reduction of barriers, especially by nations that are poten-
tially food-importing, would measurably increase the volume
of international trade in agricultural products. The question
still remains, how much of these overseas markets would ac-
crue to the American, and how much to the Argentine, the
Egyptian, or the Australian farmer? For, by and large, if the
tariff barriers of importing nations fall, they will fall for
others besides ourselves. It is not certain that the comparative
advantage of the United States in respect to the things which
it exports, as that phrase is used by students of international
trade, is as great as it was formerly; or even, in the case of
some products (possibly including wheat) that it still exists.
If the advantage of the United States in exporting farm prod-
ucts has declined, such a decline must, like the fall in relative
numbers engaged in agriculture, be viewed as the obverse of
the growth of manufacturing and of other activities. But this
possibility suggests that, even if tariff barriers are substan-
tially reduced upon the return of peace, the revival of farm
exports by this country may well be on a rather modest scale.
There remain two other influences to consider—govern-
ment policies initiated during the past decade, and the de-
mand created by the present war. Since 1933 the original
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Agricultural Adjustment Act and its successors have applied
acreage and marketing restrictions to numerous crops and
have distributed substantial Federal appropriations to farm-
ers in return for soil conservation and for other purposes.
These measures appear to have raised farm income signifi-
cantly above the level it would otherwise have reached. How-
ever, they have not prevented agricultural output from at-
taining record levels, nor have they brought to a halt the
steady decline in the relative number of persons engaged in
farming. There are two ways—and only two ways—in which
government policy might conceivably prevent a further de-
cline in agriculture's share of the working population. One
is by promoting a still more rapid expansion of output; the
other is by halting the rise in output per worker.
Current agricultural policy affects the demand for farm
products by promoting research, particularly toward new
uses for fibers; by diverting surplus commodities toward, or
subsidizing consumption by, lower income groups; and by
subsidizing the export of farm products. Within recent years
the Department of Agriculture has been active in all three
directions. Of these, only the development of new uses for
farm products could permanently check the drift away from
the land, and few such uses are yet in sight. The diversion of
surpluses toward lower income groups, especially under the
food stamp plan, is a venture of appreciable size, but its effect
upon output is ultimately limited by the potential disappear-
ance of the undernourished. Export subsidies have still more
obvious limitations so far as long term expansion is con-
cerned. To date the adjustment programs have tended to
emphasize the restriction of output, at least so far as increased
farm income might encourage the expansion of staple crops.
Even if, as many consider, Agricultural Adjustment has come
to stay, its probable effects upon the long term level of agri-
cultural output appear distinctly limited.
It hardly seems possible that our current agricultural312 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
policies will halt the rising trend in output per worker.
Whether or not the farmer continues to have a motive for
improving his methods and increasing the productivity of
his enterprise depends very much upon the mechanism by
which his activities are controlled. Under the original Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and under the Soil Con-
servation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 the chief em-
phasis ]ay upon acreage reduction, and where this is the
principal form of control a strong motive remains for the im-
provement of yield per acre. It has been argued that some of
the early programs "tended to subsidize inefficient and high-
cost farming to a significant extent."And on .the other side
it has been claimed that the more recent soil conservation
plans, besides encouraging soil-building and the concentra-
tion of crops on the best land, have had some effect in hasten-
ing the adoption of superior techniques at other points also.'6
In the cotton and tobacco acts of 1934 control shifted to the
marketing quota, and in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 provision for marketing restrictions was extended to
wheat, corn and rice. The same method of control has been
applied also to a number of minor crops, particularly fruit
and vegetables. Where marketing quotas are in force the ad-
vantage of obtaining a higher yield per acre is diminished,
but other forms of cost reduction may still appear worth striv-
ing for. Evidently, technological advance may continue. In
fact there is little reason to suppose that government policy
will prevent further increases in output per worker.
We may conclude that the number of persons likely to be
engaged in farming in the future is not subject to any appre-
ciable influence by present government policies. Increased
rewards to agriculturalists may slow down the drift from the
soil, but we may still expect that, as opportunities for em-
15 E. G. Nourse, J. S. Davis and J. D. Black, Three Years of the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (Brookings, 1937), p. 374.
16 T. 'W. Schultz, "Economic Effects of Agricultural Programs," American
Economic Review, Vol. XXX, No. 5 (Feb. 1941), p. 139.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 313
ployment in nonagricultural occupations expand, the frac-
tion of the working population engaged in farming will
continue to. diminish.
In spite of its obvious current importance, it seems diffi-
cult to believe that the present war can have much influence
upon the long-term tendencies. we have examined. During
the first World War the output of many farm products went
to record levels. It was a substantial undertaking to feed and
clothe large armies and to supply our allies. Today, too, out-
lets exist (with few exceptions) for all the produce our farms
can furnish. Increase in food exports, coupled with decline
in imports (starch and sugar), and expanded demand for ma-
terials (especially fibers and oils) by industry will insure rec-
ord agricultural output and income as long as hostilities con-
tinue. And when th.e present war is over, food may be needed
by starving populations on the continent of Europe. For a
time shortages of fertilizers and machinery, and even of labor,
may be expected to restrict farm output in Europe and per-
haps in other parts of the world as well, and thus temporarily
maintain a high level of exports by the United States. But it
seems reasonably certain that within a very few years after
the advent of peace the trends discussed in this chapter will
reassert themselves. There appear to be no reasons for suppos-
ing that current and prospective high levels of farm output
will prove any more permanent than did similar levels oc-
casioned by the first World War. The present war may per-
haps retard, but it can hardly prevent, further reductions in
the fraction of the community's human resources devoted to
farming.
Up to this point the distribution of resources between agri-
cultural and other kinds of employment has been considered
mainly in relative terms. We have discussed the fa.ctors that
might be expected to influence the percentage of the occupied
population attached to agriculture from one period to an-
other. The trend in this percentage, in the United States as in314 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
most other western countries, has been observed to be a
downward one. We have seen that historically the trend is of
long duration, and have suggested that—partly for physio-
logical, partly for technological, reasons—it is likely to con-
tinue. On the other hand until very recently this downward
trend did not imply any absolute reduction in the number of
farmers. That peak employment in agriculture is already past
seems fairly well established from the data in Chapter 6:
between 1920 and 1940 the number of persons occupied in
farming apparently fell by about 2 million. If the decline
in the rate of population growth continues, and especially if
two or three decades hence population increase ceases alto-
gether, a further decline in agriculture's fraction of the labor
force seems likely to involve further reductions in the abso-
lute number of persons or families engaged in farming.
In an economy where choice of occupation is free, a reduc-
tion in the number of persons attached to agriculture can
come about, in the ordinary course of events, only through a
decline in its net advantages relative to those of other occu-
pations. During the nineteenth century it was undoubtedly
the comparative unattractiveness of farming which prevented
the absolute number of those engaged in it from rising as
rapidly as those engaged in manufacturing. Governmental
policy has tended to raise farm incomes during the past dec-
ade; yet the absolute number of persons engaged in farming
already shows a marked decline. It is the relative advantages
that count, and if other occupations were sufficiently attrac-
tive even "parity incomes" might not prevent a decline in the
number of farmers.
We conclude, then, that the pressure to reduce the fraction
of the community's efforts devoted to farming, and thereby
also the absolute number of agriculturalists, must reassert it-
self before the cessation of hostilities has receded very far into
the past. Only factors of a rather long range character are
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for a continued downward adjustment in the scale of domestic
agriculture, when this is measured in terms of persons oc-
cupied in farming. Possible influences of this sort have al-
ready been enumerated: a cessation of technical advance in
farming; a substantial shift in dietary habits in the direction
of more expensive foodstuffs; entirely uses for industrial
purposes of fibers or other farm products. It is unlikely that
technical improvements in agriculture have exhausted their
scope, or that further declines in labor per unit of output
should not be anticipated. Further diversification in diet ap-
pears quite probable, but the possible increase on this score
in the demand for farmers' services appears to be somewhat
limited. Some alleviation of the downward pressure upon
the scale of agriculture may indeed be anticipated from
changes in dietary habits, but their influence is hardly likely
to be decisive and will probably be felt principally rather in
shifts from one type of farming to another than in any in-
crease in aggregate employment in the industry. Some new
industrial applications of farm products were noticed in Chap-
ter 3, but the outlook here is too uncertain for accurate
appraisal.
As our study progressed, certain long range factors emerged
eveti more clearly from the agricultural picture. Among these
factors technical progress, the slowing down of population
growth and the inelasticity of the demand for foodstuffs per-
haps stand out most clearly. Like other industries, agricul-
ture has been forced to adapt itself to a changing environ-
ment. This adaptation has involved a cessation of growth or
actual reduction in the output of some products, rapid ex-
pansion in the production of others. It has affected diverse
farming areas in very different fashion. While agricultural
output as a whole is still tending upward, the past four dec-
ades have seen farm employment reach a peak and begin to
decline. Changes such as these.are a measure of adaptation al-
ready achieved. The extent to which fwther adaptation316 AMERICANAGRICULTURE
will be required in the future depends primarily upon the
course of long range factors of the kind we have discussed.
Note by C. Reinold Noyes, Director—The first seven chapters of American
Agriculture, 1899—1939, consist of a somewhat detailed study of the available
statistics on the following subjects:
(1) Output of the chief agricultural commodities, together with a chapter
on the nation's changing food requirements.
(2) Employment on farms (including self-employment) together with a
chapter on changes in technology, farm machinery, etc. The comparison of
employment with output figures yields estimates of changed output per
worker.
From this very restricted basis the authors then launch into a final chapter
which attempts to deal with the vast subject of "Agriculture in the Nation's
Economy."
The general conclusion appears to be that aggregate agricultural output
will shortly cease to increase and that the trend of the past 20 years toward
an absolute reduction iiithose gainfully occupied in agriculture will con-
tinue. The first part of this conclusion is not based on present trends in
output, which are still generally upward, but on the expected influence of
several trends in demand—first, the recent trend toward the loss of foreign
markets; second, the trend in births over deaths pointing toward a stationary
population; and third, the recent trend toward the consumption of "protec-
tive" instead of basic foods. With regard to basic foods the existing income
elasticity of demand is assumed to be zero or negative. The second part of
the general conclusion is based on one trend appearing for the first time in
the last 20 years—the absolute decline in farm workers—and on another and
longer one—improvements in technique permitting workers for a given
output. This part is also supported by a priori reasoning from, or interpreta-
tion in the light of, theory—the theory of "relative advantages"_and by
analogy with Western Europe where the authors have detected a "diversion
of resources" from agriculture to industry.
This conclusion takes a very positive position on a vital question which
has been exercising this country, politically and socially, for the past twenty
years. It lends support to the policy of "letting nature take its course" or to
the more humane forms of the same policy—the limitation of agricultural
production and the facilitation of transfer of superfluous farm population to
other pursuits. Moreover, the fact that these arguments and conclusions,
while not in themselves novel, are ostensibly the result of a piece of purely
scientific analysis might well increase the weight of this support. The question
of their validity is therefore one of more than usual importance.
My judgment isthat the last chapter of this book—the argument and
conclusions—is subject to three serious kinds of weakness in respect of scien-
tific method. In what follows I am concerned, first, with the validity of the
methods used by these authors in deriving their conclusions and, second, with
the presentation of a different approach, of apparently equal propriety, which
leads to precisely the opposite conclusions. In the light of the first I conclude
that the conclusions presented in the last chapter are opinions rather than
scientific forecasts; in the light of the second I conclude that one opinion is
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The three types of weakness in method may be described as follows:
1. It seems inappropriate to proceed on the assumption that the brief
trends described in this report are secular and can therefore be used to
extrapolate the future. These trends may be no more than swings in long
cycles or even parts of movements in historical processes that will shortly
come to an end.
2. Ii seems improper:
a. To draw conclusions with regard to a large and complex subject from
the examination of one sector of that subject only.
b. To draw conclusions not implicit in the data studied, with the aid of
imported assumptions or considerations not examined asto their
validity; or, conversely, to omit other conclusions which are implicit
in the data but not consistent with those presented.
c. To treat as trends the net change accomplished by two opposite
movements occurring in succession.
3. It seems undesirable to approach empirical studies such as this with pre-
conceived theories, into the framework of which the facts are forced. This is
apt to lead to distortion of the facts and to their misinterpretation.
Under 1, above, it should be noted that all of the influences given weight
in deterrnini4lg the general conclusion are treated as trends, though several
of those which are not given weight are treated as temporary only. Upon
what basis is this discrimination made? Is it sound? Under 2a, I would point
to the fact that the other two factors in agricultural production, land and
capital, are excluded fromconsideration in the "distribution of resources" to
agriculture and, therefore, their influence, if any, is not appraised; further-
more, the period examined is but a small portion of a long historical process
in which this temporal sector may play but an inconsiderable part. Under
2b, II would cite first the importation of the population trend, without dis-
cussion, and the dismissal of agricultural policy without previous examina-
tion. Under 2b, also, two contrary conclusions appear to have deserved con-
sideration, or more than they get, because they are implicit in the data.
The trends of output are still upward, particularly if the influence of the
long period of drought years on grains is discounted. It appears that the long
drought in the Middle West showed lowered grain yields (Chart 47, p. 281)
and some loss of animals inall the years from 1931to1937 inclusive.
Perhaps to determine the true trend these years should have been passed
over and 1940—42 added. The output of grains in 1938 was the fourth
highest and of meats in 1939 the highest ever (Table 5, pp. 42-43, above). Per-
haps the special effect of the drought years vitiates conclusions based on
5-year averages and ending on the average arou,nd 1937. If this trend had
been considered, remarks on demand (pp. 291-93) could not have been inter-
preteci as "trends in output" (p. 294). These features of demand may affect
output. But since they have not done so as yet it is improper to telescope the
two. Again, in view of the food trend (Chapter 4) to products requiring a
much larger input of labor (Chapter 7), the three lines (Chapter 8, p. 307)
in which this is dismissed as an influence seem to be inadequate considera-
tion. Under 2c, I cite p. 294. I.n spite of the fact that there was an increase
in agricultural employment from 1899 to about 1920 and that the decline
since, though slightly greater, has only lasted for about 20 years, there is
constant reference to the process, as if it had been going on for a long time.AMERICAN
Thus "drift from the soil" (Chapter 8, p. 312), "the transfer of labor from
agriculture to other occupations" (p.309), the "downward adjustment in
the scale of domestic agriculture" and in the "absolute number of agricul-
turalists" (pp. 314 and 315). Under 3, I refer to the whole view that the "rela-
tive attractiveness" of agriculture and industry has determined theirre-
spective rates of growth. "The striking decline in the relative importance of
agriculture in the economy of the nation must undoubtedly be attributed
to the superior attractiveness of other occupations" (p. 299; see also p. 301,
end of paragraph, and p. 314). It is that view which leads to all the empha-
sis on the "relative" measures of agricultural employment, income, etc., in
this final chapter, so much of which is meaningless in the light of the actual
historical process. Itis, of course, true that a nation is well off in inverse
proportion to the percentage of its population required to produce its food.
That is equally true in regard to all its other requirements—shoes and ships
and sealing-wax. But because such economizings are to be welcomed is no
reason why they should be expected or treated as a law of nature. More-
over, in the actual historical process, changes in the ratios between 'agricul-
ture and industry—of output, employment, income, etc.—are largely acci-
dental, due to the fact that the two developments take place under different
limiting conditions and are almost wholly independent of each other.
Because it lies behind much of my criticism, and because it has a strong
bearing on the conclusions advanced in this study and still more so on the
most important "agricultural problem," it may be well to elaborate on this
matter of historical process—the other approach referred to above. Growth
seems to be taken as a matter of course by our generation. As a matter of
fact, in the socio-economic field, it is almost an abnormality. In most periods
of history population has been limited by the food supply and the food sup-
ply has been limited by available land—except as occasional improvements in
technique have increased the yield per acre. When available land was fixed,
the food supply (with the above exception) consequently the population
were also approximately fixed. Correspondingly, in most periods of history
all other (industrial) production has been fixed, chiefly by the limits of tech-
nique (output per worker) and only slightly by the availability of raw mate-
rials. Against this background the economic development of the United
States appears as an exception to the rule. Here, economic growth has been,
in its two chief aspects, the result of two almost unique historical processes
stemming from the same root but thereafter almost wholly independent of
each other.
These two processes were, or are, the settlement of the United States and
its industrialization (Industrial Revolution). The first movement began, on a
continental scale, after the Revolutionary War and continued in the agricul-
tural sphere until about 1920, when it appears to have been practically com-
pleted—i.e. the frontier disappeared. This movement is ignored entirely in
this study, though some trends are shown from 1799 and though the process
continued through about half the period under review—that is, from 1899 to
1919. The second movement, industrialization, can hardly be dated, but its
most notable effects appeared after 1870, say, and it is continuing today. This
movement is referred to occasionally in this study, but its fundamental effects
on these trends are not mentioned. There is room in what follows for only
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The development of agriculture in the United States up to 1920 was in
large part determined by the unique historical process of settlement. The
settlement of a new country consists first—always and necessarily_-of settle-
ment on the land to raise food. The analogy of a flow of water over the land
is appropriate. The water tends to cover the land before it begins to grow
deep. So agriculture covers the land first before other pursuits follow. But
some other pursuits (e.g. trade and transportation) tend to follow almost
;mmediately. It is cloubtftil if the thirteen colonies, or any subsequent settle-
ments, ever showed more than 60 to 70 percent of employed engaged in agri-
culture. Since agriculture still accounted for 53 percent of the gainfully em-
ployed in 1870 itis clear that most of the increase in gainfully employed
up tothat time was due to settlement of new land. But the rate of
settlement was largely governed by acquisition and opening up of new terri-
tory, and by extension of transportation facilities, all within the limits made
possible by growth of population. In 1850, when the acquisition of new ter-
ritory was completed, only 15 percent of the land area was in farms as against
50 percent by 1920. As far as the Great West was concerned the process of
opening up the new territory only began after the Civil War and was not
completed until after 1900. As far as the limitation set by population growth
is concerned it would have required the entire population increase from
1790 up to 1870 or even 1880 to settle the enlarged area with the same ratio
employed on the farm as at the beginning. It was these delaying factors
which made the movement extend over more than 130 years, and only
gradually permitted the increase of land in farms from probably less than
95 million acres (present acreage of thirteen colonies) in 1790 to about ten
times that in 1920.
The rate of growth in agriculture (acreage, output and employment) was
almost uniquely determined by the rate of settlement of new land. There-
fore, the rate was almost completely independent of the rate of industrializa-
tion and had no Connection with trends abroad where settlement was already
complete long before industrialization really commenced. It is to be assumed
that this growth so far as acreage is concerned will now stop, since settle-
ment is complete. For land is limited in a sense that labor and capital are
not. The absolute limit may have been reached in 1920. By reason of the
substitution of capital for labor increased productivity per worker might
theoretically continue. Bitt, up to 1920, this process involved more land per
worker, not more product per acre. Roughly speaking, from 1890 to 1920
acreage per gainfully employed increased from 6S toPage 286 above shows
that the increase per manhour, even up to 1930, was all in the form of fewer
hours per acre and none in greater yield per acre. The latter changed little
until very lately (p. 285). This trend, then, up to 1920 or 1930, represented a
movement toward more extensive culture—and the added land per worker
was new land. How can that continue, if the limit of land has been reached?
Will It be reversed? Any further increase in output would appear to require
the substitution of intensive for extensive agriculture, a process which, in
most lines, has not yet appeared in this country. Where it obtains it always
involves more labor per acre. Can the substitution of capital for labor oper-
ate in intensive culture? If it cannot, then any further increase in output will
doubtless reverse the past and present trend, in output per worker, and
therefore necessitate an increase in absolute employment in agriculture, as it320 AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
has elsewhere, thus reversing also the recent trend in absolute employment.
Hence the historical viewpoint leads to a forecast precisely the opposite of
our authors' conclusions, if an increase in output is needed. Whether that
does become necessary depends, of course, on whether there isto be any
futureincrease in population. That is anybody's guess. On the face of the
matter, however, a condition under which the world's richest area, in point
of natural resources, continued to maintain a population with a density only
from one-half to one-tenth that of the other chief areas that are well en-
dowed, would appear to be a condition of unstable equilibrium. Such. a
continuance may be very desirable. Whether itis probable or even possible
is another question.
During the period of growth of acreage (settlement) increase of major food
crops was always possible, hut the rate was usually governed by the character
of the new land and by the process of settlement itself. For instance, from
1850 to 1890 land in farms increased about 112 percent; but wheat acreage
increased about 275 percent. On the other hand, from 1890 to 1920 wheat
acreage increased at about the same rate as land in farms—that is, about
14 percent. Again, as other population followed along after the first settlers,
subdivision of farms took place and the character of local demand changed.
This tended to displace grains and meat in the old sections. The same tend-
ency was enhanced by rapidexhaustion of the soil by "soil-robbers" (e.g.
New England and New York). Thus the process of settlement seems to have
accounted for much of the changes in the composition of output, until re-
cently, and for the fact that these changes have exhibited no single long-
term trend.
The second historical process referred to above, the industrial development
of the United States, has been chiefly determined by the equally unique but
different movement cal led the Industrial Revolution. Because developments
in the two fields, agriculture and industry, have been principally the results
of these two almost entirely independent processes there is no a priori rea-
son to expect that the rate of growth should have been similar in both.
Comparisons of such rates are therefore almost meaningless, in any scientific
sense. They are ratios between two independent variables.
These two movements were also entirely separate in their influence on
growth and allocation of population. Settlement without the Industrial Revo.
lution might have increased the population from 4 to 40 million, as noted
above. The Industrial Revolution appears to have been for the
other two thirds of the increase to 1940. And this accords with the figures for
Western Europe where, in the most intense period of industrialization (1810—
1910, say) the population increased to about 3 times (200 percent) its former
level, although, there, no opportunity for further settlement on the land
existed. (Neither was there "diversion of human resources" on any extensive
scale abroad. Approximately the same population remained on the land. It
was the increase that went into industry.) Thus, after this form of indus-
trialization, countries generally seemto show about one third the proportion
of population on the land that existed before. Taking the bro,ad view, it was
the process of settlement, which occurred only here, that determinedthe
expansion of agriculture and the growth of population on the land; it was
the independent process of the Industrial Revolution that determined the
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populationon the land to total population. Settlement is now probably com-
plete; industrialization may not be; if industrialization continues to develop,
population will probably continue to increase; therefore this one factor in
the ratio will probably determine the trend in ratio of population on the
land to total population. But whether or not such future industrialization
will occur cannot be determined by extrapolation of past time series even of
the very recent past.
Of the total increase of population nearly one third was due to immigra-
tion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Of this number—some 38 mil-
lion in all—all but 7 million caine over after 1870. Therefore, though immi-
grants did participate in the settlement process, both before and after 1870,
they came chiefly for industrial employment in the period after our indus-
trialization had really got going. The relation of that portion of our growth
of population to industrialization was a direct one. The growth was in re-
sponse to demand for industrial labor and was the chief limiting factor upon
the rate of industrialization. However, that immigration for industrial em-
ployment was largely responsible for the change in the relativefigures
between 1870 and 1920. There was no drift away fromthe land; there was a
drift of foreign population to industry. The significance to both agriculture
industry of the reduction of this immigration in 1924 and its near cessa-
tion in 1930 has not yet been appraised.
Besides facilitating the process of settlement in many ways (e.g. transporta-
tion) and making possible some industrialization of the farm (e.g. power and
machinery) the Industrial Revolution relieved the farming population of
much manufacturing and, on the other hand, it concentrated almost all
agricultural production on the farm. On both sides the last process represents
a change in product rather than a change in productivity and should modify
estimates of changes in productivity, even after 1899, to a very considerable
extent.
From this more inclusive and more fundamental viewpoint the authors'
choice of the period to be studied—doubtless on account of availability of
statistics—seems unfortunate. Their forty years divides itself into two halves,
which in certain respects are in marked contrast to one another. The first
half appears to represent the last two decades of the process of settlement.
The peak of acreage so far was in 1920; that of employment of males so far
was also in 1920. The second half may possibly represent new trends—drift
from the farm, etc. But twenty years of troublous times are not enough to
settle that question. So far the signs of drift are only marked in the last
decade (1930—40) which included the prolonged depression and the prolonged
drought. At any rate, from this standpoint it appears clearly unsafe to hitch
together trends prior to, and trends after, 1920. The forty years represents a
mixture in which the trends in certain respects are in opposite directions.
Even though the direction may seem to be the same in some cases, the causes
may be quite different. Finally, if there is any chance that these recent trends
merely represent swings, or temporary processes, itis clearly unsafe to let
them delude us into dismantling any part of our agricultural economy or
allowing it to run down. And, on the chance that the Maithusian "law" is
still operating under our noses, it may be wiser to tide over, by artificial
measures, what may prove to be only an interim period before the pressure
of population on the food supply will again begin to be felt.